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Abstract
In this review essay Stanton Wortham explores how philosophy of education should both turn inward,
engaging with concepts and arguments developed in academic philosophy, and outward, encouraging
educational publics to apply philosophical approaches to educational policy and practice. He develops his
account with reference to two recent ambitious projects: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education,
edited by Harvey Siegel, and the two-volume yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education
(NSSE), titled Why Do We Educate? edited by Gary Fenstermacher (series editor), David Coulter and John
Wiens (volume 1), and Mark Smylie (volume 2). These two projects initially appear to be opposed, with the
Handbook emphasizing elite philosophy and the Yearbook emphasizing public engagement. Wortham argues
that each project is in fact more complex, and that they are in some respects complementary. He concludes by
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ABSTRACT. In this review essay Stanton Wortham explores how philosophy of education 
should both turn inward, engaging with concepts and arguments developed in academic 
philosophy, and outward,  encouraging educational publics to apply philosophical 
approaches to educational policy and practice. He develops this argument with  
reference to two recent ambitious projects: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education, 
edited by Harvey Siegel, and the two-volume yearbook of the National 
Society for the Study of Education (NSSE), titled Why Do We Educate? edited by Gary 
Fenstermacher (series editor), David Coulter and John Wiens (volume 1), and Mark 
Smylie (volume 2). These two projects initially appear to be opposed, with the Handbook 
emphasizing elite philosophy and the Yearbook emphasizing public engagement. 
Wortham  argues that each project is in fact more complex, and that they are in some 
respects complementary. He concludes by making a case against a simple hierarchy of 











The works under review in this essay — the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of 
Education, edited by Harvey Siegel, and the National Society for the Study of Education’s 
two-volume yearbook, Why Do We Educate? edited by Gary Fenstermacher — present a 
broad range of work in the field of philosophy of education.1 Each of these substantial 
projects hopes to reposition the field. The twenty-eight-chapter Handbook is 
comprehensive, with sections on aims, reasoning, ethics, knowledge, and politics. About 
two-thirds of the authors are what Siegel calls “general philosophers,” who work “in 
departments of philosophy and publish … in mainstream philosophy journals” (OPE, 4), 
and most of the rest are well-known philosophers of education. All of the authors 
contributing to this volume avoid or explain technical terminology, and the chapters in 
this collection are thus clearly written and mostly compelling. The Handbook will be of 
interest to many general philosophers and to almost all philosophers of education, as 
well as to scholars in education who are comfortable with theory. Like most serious 
philosophical work, it will probably not appeal broadly to educational researchers, 
policymakers, practitioners, or the general public. The two-volume NSSE Yearbook, on 
the other hand, is aimed directly at these four groups. About half of the twenty-one 
chapters in the first volume are written by philosophers of education, a few are written 
by general philosophers, and the rest are written by educational researchers. The 
chapters introduce philosophical questions about the purposes of education and connect 
these to educational policy and practice. The first volume will be useful to philosophers 
of education and of interest to academically inclined practitioners, policymakers, and 
citizens. The second volume contains about 100 short pieces or excerpts ! mostly in 
nonacademic genres ! from a range of artists, entertainers, businesspeople, scientists, 
educators, politicians, clergy, journalists, and scholars. These selections raise interesting 
questions about the ends of education and take various positions. This volume will 
interest anyone who wants to be provoked by and to reflect on heterogeneous claims 
about educational purposes.  
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Philosophy of education, as Siegel defines it, “is that branch of philosophy that 
addresses philosophical questions concerning the nature, aims and problems of 
education.… [It] look[s] both inward to the parent discipline of philosophy and outward 
to educational practice” (OPE, 3). This distinction can be applied to the books under 
review here, as well: The Handbook looks inward, while the Yearbook looks outward. 
Siegel notes that many of the most important general philosophers from Plato through 
the middle of the twentieth century wrote about topics in the philosophy of education as 
part of their broader philosophical work, but he claims that philosophy of education has 
in recent decades been “abandoned” by general philosophers for “contingent historical” 
reasons — which he unfortunately does not elaborate, because it would be useful to 
understand the abandonment. Siegel notes that this deprives philosophy of education of 
talented potential contributors and, I would add, hurts its standing within the academy. 
The Handbook’s primary goal is  
restoration of philosophy of education to its rightful place in the world of general 
philosophy, by playing some role in furthering the recent rekindling of interest 
among general philosophers in philosophy of education: in their taking seriously 
philosophical problems concerning education, and in putting the latter on their 
philosophical agendas. (OPE, 7) 
The Handbook, then, looks inward toward the “parent” discipline of philosophy, trying 
to garner attention and respect from general philosophers and trying to enlist them in 
studying educational issues. In contrast, the Yearbook looks outward, trying to catalyze 
public conversations about the ends of education. The series editor Gary Fenstermacher 
and his fellow volume editors argue that “too many public discussions of education are 
dominated by too few ideas” (RC, 1) and that we need a more “robust, inclusive and 
incisive conversation about education and schooling” (VC, 2). The first volume is 
“designed to aid persons to contribute to the conversation” (RC, 2) by modeling more 
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philosophically informed discussion about the ends of education. The second volume 
presents pieces in the ongoing conversation that is already taking place, both 
demonstrating that interesting claims about the aims of education are being made and 
providing points of entry for readers to join that conversation. 
It appears, then, that the two projects offer different answers to the questions in 
my title. The Handbook argues that general philosophers have professional expertise that 
can be productively applied to educational topics and phenomena. The results will 
include insights and arguments that may be of use to educational researchers, 
practitioners, policymakers, and the public ! perhaps in the same way as the results of 
basic scientific research are often useful in the long run ! but professionals should work 
through the substantive issues before engaging nonphilosophers about possible 
applications. The Yearbook argues that philosophers of education should use what they 
already know to engage educational researchers, practitioners, policymakers, and the 
public in richer conversations about the ends of education. This seems at first glance to 
stand in opposition to the approach of the Handbook: instead of turning inward toward 
the discipline of philosophy, philosophers of education should be turning outward 
toward educational stakeholders; instead of focusing on the elite group of general 
philosophers, the Yearbook hopes to deepen an ongoing popular conversation about 
education. On the other hand, one might argue that the two projects are not opposed but 
complementary. What exactly is the Yearbook bringing to the broader public 
conversation about education? Perhaps it is contributing knowledge and techniques that 
have been developed by general philosophers in professional publications such as the 
Handbook. This essay explores whether the two projects are opposed or complementary. 
In the first two sections I argue that neither project is as univocal as it initially seems, 
and I suggest that philosophy of education should turn both inward and outward. In the 
final section I argue for a heterogeneous philosophy of education.  
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Turning Toward the Academy 
In his introduction to the Handbook, Siegel argues that “the pursuit of 
philosophical questions concerning education is partly dependent upon investigations 
of the more familiar core areas of philosophy” (OPE, 4). He also uses the term “depend 
on” when illustrating what he means by this ! for example, questions about curriculum 
depend on general philosophical issues explored in epistemology and questions of 
learning depend on investigations in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. He does 
add adverbs such as “routinely,” “typically,” or “often” to these claims, so it would take 
further investigation to determine precisely what Siegel means by “dependence” here. 
But the metaphor of general philosophy as “core” also implies that investigations in the 
philosophy of education must draw on concepts, arguments, and insights from general 
philosophy, while the reverse is not true. The Handbook appears to set up a hierarchical 
relation between general philosophy and philosophy of education. In what follows I 
explore where the chapters in the Handbook stand with respect to this apparently 
hierarchical relation. Only a few offer explicit arguments on the topic, but all of the 
chapters position themselves and their intended audiences in relevant ways. 
Handbook authors do three types of positioning on this issue. About a quarter of 
the chapters (spread across the various sections) describe contemporary work on a topic 
in general philosophy, then explain how this can illuminate issues of concern to 
philosophers of education, educational researchers, policymakers, and practitioners. 
These chapters presuppose that general philosophy forms a “core” that can be applied to 
educational topics. Many of these chapters are useful, explaining contemporary 
philosophical insights and describing interesting applications. Emily Robertson explores 
how knowledge can be warranted despite the fact that knowers are always 
sociopolitically located. She applies established distinctions and arguments from general 
philosophy and provides insight for those who study how education helps students 
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develop warranted knowledge. Richard Feldman defines the key aspects of arguments 
and explores how one might teach students to appreciate and critique them better. Like 
Robertson’s, his chapter is not intended to make original contributions to general 
philosophy itself. In fact, he argues that important issues “sometimes get lost in the 
[general] philosophical debates about the nature and goals of argument” (OPE, 68). The 
Handbook provides Feldman an opportunity to step back and look at the fundamentals, 
presumably because those in education need a less technical overview. His chapter 
contains philosophical arguments in which he makes useful distinctions and provides 
systematic support for claims, but he does this in the service of explaining established 
terrain to outsiders. Writing in a similar way about another domain, Michael Slote 
reviews arguments that justice should be conceptualized in terms of care and relation 
instead of decontextualized autonomy. He cites arguments from general philosophy and 
elaborates their implications for education. Other chapters also bring concepts and 
arguments from general philosophy to bear on educational issues. Robert Audi applies 
philosophical theories to the question of how science educators can be neutral toward 
religion; Richard Grandy draws on epistemology and philosophy of science to explore 
whether teachers should emphasize established scientific theories or explore students’ 
own conceptions of nature; and Lawrence Blum develops a philosophical account of 
prejudice in order to explore how one might educate against it. All of these chapters 
offer clear reviews of general philosophical work and demonstrate its relevance to 
education. 
Almost half of the Handbook authors position themselves in a different way: they 
develop arguments about topics in the philosophy of education, without presupposing 
that general philosophy has something in particular to add. Some of these authors are 
general philosophers and others are philosophers of education. All employ concepts and 
ways of thinking that are recognizably philosophical ! they carefully examine 
! (!
alternative positions, diligently look for tacit assumptions, and systematically attend to 
grounds for belief — and almost all draw on work in general philosophy. Eamonn 
Callan and Dylan Arena address the question of whether, if the ends are worthy, 
indoctrination is justifiable. They argue that the creation of closed-mindedness, even in 
the service of indoctrinating young people into true belief, is inappropriate. Rob Reich 
argues that children themselves should have more say in how they are educated, and he 
describes tensions between the legitimate educational interests of parents, children, and 
the state. Harry Brighouse outlines the primary aims of education and shows the 
difficulty of adjudicating conflicts among them. Meira Levinson carefully describes ten 
goals that underlie “multicultural education” and outlines incompatibilities among 
mutually exclusive versions. Amy Gutmann argues for a particular version of 
multicultural education, one that creates “equal citizenship,” mutual toleration, and 
appropriate recognition of groups. Both Catherine Elgin and Martha Nussbaum argue 
for the importance of the arts and humanities in a society increasingly concerned with 
technical expertise and rapid returns from education. All these chapters, and several 
others, draw on work in general philosophy as well as work in the philosophy of 
education to develop well-reasoned arguments about important educational issues. 
The remaining quarter of the Handbook chapters show how questions in the 
philosophy of education play a crucial role in general philosophy. These chapters 
undermine the alleged hierarchy, claiming that philosophy of education is “intertwined” 
with general philosophy and that some educational issues are so “deep” that 
investigation of them is required to answer general philosophical questions. Several 
chapters in this group are among the most provocative in the volume. Stefaan Cuypers 
claims explicitly that there are “essential,” “intrinsic” connections between general 
philosophy and the philosophy of education. He argues that general philosophical 
accounts of free will must explore “education for authenticity,” the process through 
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which autonomous wills emerge in nondeterministic, noncoercive education. Philip 
Kitcher also argues explicitly that key issues in general philosophy depend on 
philosophy of education. He illustrates this with an argument about tensions between 
liberal educational ideals and the demands of an economic system that presupposes an 
alternative vision of human flourishing. Amelie Rorty argues that imaginative thinking 
is essential to practical rationality, and she explores whether and how this can be taught. 
Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith analyze a type of teaching central to general 
philosophy, Socratic teaching. Elijah Millgram explores moral education in order to 
develop an argument about the dependence of moral standards on moral communities 
and the shifts in moral communities over time.  
There is no conceptual conflict between the three types of positioning done by 
Handbook authors, and one could argue that some chapters adopt more than one 
position. Several chapters in the first group show convincingly that philosophers of 
education and educational researchers could benefit from ideas and approaches 
developed in general philosophy. At the same time, as illustrated in the second group, 
philosophers from whatever subfield can and should continue to do systematic work 
exploring educational questions. Neither of these approaches contradicts the claim made 
by the third group of authors, that some core issues in general philosophy require 
engagement with educational questions. Siegel himself agrees that all three approaches 
are valuable. He laments the separation between general philosophy and philosophy of 
education, and he envisions mutually beneficial interconnections between the two fields. 
He does want general philosophers to have more interest in and influence over the 
philosophy of education. But he also argues that “the pursuit of fundamental questions 
in more or less all the core areas of philosophy often leads naturally to and is sometimes 
enhanced by sustained attention to questions about education” (OPE, 5) and that 
educational questions are “intertwined” with many general philosophical issues. This 
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envisions general philosophy as an enterprise essentially engaged with educational 
questions because it cannot answer core questions about knowledge, ethics, and sociality 
without addressing how humans do and should develop cognitively, ethically, and 
socially ! and these developmental processes cannot be elucidated without examining 
education in a broad sense. The Handbook thus offers two answers to the question of how 
general philosophy should relate to philosophy of education: one assumes a hierarchy 
between the two, with “core” knowledge from the “parent discipline” moving only in 
one direction, downstream to the applied field, while the other envisions a more 
complex mutual dependence that enriches both. General philosophers have important 
knowledge and practices to offer philosophers of education, educational researchers, 
policymakers, practitioners, and the public, but the discipline can also benefit from 
engaging with educational topics and perhaps educational practices.  
Turning Toward Educational Publics 
The two-volume NSSE Yearbook turns outward, hoping to engage educational 
researchers, policymakers, practitioners, and the public in conversation about the ends 
of education. But what kind of public conversation do the volumes envision, and what 
do philosophers have to contribute? The titles for the two volumes begin the same way 
! Why Do We Educate? ! but end differently. The first volume, which has a “more 
traditional scholarly character” (Fenstermacher in VC, 3), is titled Renewing the 
Conversation, while the second is called Voices from the Conversation. The editors imagine 
different tasks for the two volumes and a different status for the authors in each. The 
first volume, edited by David Coulter and John Wiens, has the potential to influence the 
public conversation about the ends of education, while the second, edited by Mark 
Smylie, presents excerpts from that conversation as it exists. As Fenstermacher, the 
series editor, says, the first “volume is intended to advance” the conversation while the 
second merely “samples” it (VC, 3). The first volume is intended to act upon the reader 
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-  it is “designed to aid persons to contribute to the conversation” (Fenstermacher in RC, 
 
2) - while the second volume does not have this capacity. The editors hope that 
readers, having been prepared by the first volume to participate in a philosophically 
invigorated public conversation about the ends of education, will interact more 
effectively with voices such as those presented in the second volume. 
 
This section explores what the editors mean by “the conversation” - who is 
talking, about what, following what norms, and for what purposes. The volumes’ 
explicit and tacit answers to these questions reveal how they think the philosophy of 
education can and should shape public discussions of educational policy and practice. 
To begin addressing the questions, we should explore why the editors feel that 
conversation about educational ends needs renewal. Smylie, editor of the second 
volume, claims that “our society faces unforeseen changes and unprecedented 
challenges” (VC, 7) and that we have lost “anchoring principles.” Fenstermacher argues 
that current public discussions of education are narrow and of low quality and that we 
need a more “robust, inclusive and incisive conversation about education and 
schooling” (VC, 2). While it is true that contemporary  discussions of educational policy 
too often focus on raising test scores and increasing economic competitiveness, to the 
exclusion of other educational ends, the editors do not argue convincingly that “the 
conversation” needs to be renewed now more than in other times and places. In many 
historical eras Americans have felt that some problem needed urgently to be solved 
(such as incorporating former slaves into social and political life, assimilating 
immigrants, or defeating Communism), that education was crucial to solving this 
problem, and that the educational apparatus was failing to act as it should. Voices from 
 
the Conversation contains a 1963 essay by James Baldwin in which he argued that “we are 
 
living through a very dangerous time” and that education is the key to navigating it 
successfully (VC, 17). That volume also contains an essay by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi 
in which he pointed out that “public opinion in almost every country is dissatisfied 
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with the prevailing system of education” (VC, 228). Serious dissatisfaction with 
education occurs in many times and places. I am sympathetic to the editors’ belief 
that public discussions of educational ends should be made broader and deeper, but 
I am convinced neither that we face unprecedented educational challenges at this 
sociohistorical moment nor that public discussions of education have degenerated to 
unusually low levels. 
 
Optimists among us might argue that the editors and others concerned about 
improving public discussions of education have an unusual opportunity at this 
sociohistorical moment, however. Three U.S. Presidents in a row have treated education 
as a crucial aspect of government policy, and the public has also shown interest in 
education. The volume editors are correct that the resulting discussions of education 
have been narrower than most philosophers would like, but this is nonetheless a 
moment at which philosophically informed discussions of educational ends could 
perhaps influence public policy - if philosophers could somehow help educational 
publics reflect in a more philosophically informed way. The prospects for this have 
increased recently because of a shift in higher education away from an exclusive focus 
on decontextualized research as the core mission of the university and toward practical 
engagement with the world. University administrators and faculty in the arts and 
sciences are increasingly reaching out to colleagues in education and related areas, 
hoping to include practical or service content in their courses, to build partnerships with 
communities, and to focus their work in part on improving education, public health, and 
social welfare. Although the editors do not frame it this way, their project aligns with 
the argument that we should try to deepen public conversations about education at a 
time when such conversations are more likely to have an impact. 
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The first volume is intended to spark a renewed conversation. The volume 
contains twenty-one essays, about half of which are authored by scholars well-known to 
philosophers of education, including Kwame Anthony Appiah, Seyla Benhabib, Harry 
Brighouse, Eamonn Callan, Kieran Egan, Gary Fenstermacher, Nel Noddings, Martha 
Nussbaum, and Diane Ravitch. Several chapters from other authors are also compelling 
— notably an essay on divergent conceptions of childhood by Joseph Dunne, and one on 
misguided economic conceptualizations of development by Randall Nielsen and Janice 
Kinghorn. A few of the essays are reprinted from earlier publications, but most were 
written for this volume. Virtually all the authors in this first volume ! the one 
positioned to influence “the conversation” ! are academics. This presupposes that 
academics are well positioned to renew the conversation. The editors of this volume, 
Coulter and Wiens, certainly do not intend to be elitist. They begin their introduction by 
describing the admirable accounts of educational ends provided by ordinary people, 
and one of their editorial aims is to “expand the conversation” such that we all listen 
more to ordinary people’s thoughts about education. But the structure of the two 
volumes nonetheless assumes that academics have insights ! instantiated in the first 
volume’s essays ! that can renew and enrich the conversation. As Smylie suggests in 
his prologue to the second volume, academics can catalyze the “more fundamental 
conversation” that we need (VC, 7). A reader might conclude that the editors’ 
prescription is for policymakers, practitioners, and the public to begin conversing more 
like philosophers of education, thinking “about the perennial questions surrounding the 
nature of the good life” (Ken Osborne, RC, 37). This would assume a hierarchical 
relation between philosophy of education and educational policymakers, practitioners, 
and the public, with knowledge moving downstream from academics to educational 
publics. This is in some respects what the editors propose, but their vision turns out to 
be more complex. 
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We should be able to infer what the editors believe a renewed and enriched 
conversation would entail by attending to the essays themselves. The first volume can 
presumably renew the conversation because the authors say or do something that could 
positively influence policymakers, practitioners, and the public. One way it might do 
this is through the structure of the volume itself. Perhaps the volume exemplifies 
something about how the renewed conversation should go, with different sections 
representing different phases of the imagined conversation or covering key topics that 
must be engaged in a productive conversation. Neither the structure nor the content of 
the first volume reflects such an overarching account, however. In some ways the first 
few essays are a bit broader, and the last few divide up the life stages of childhood, 
adolescence, and adulthood. The largest section of essays covers a diverse set of topics in 
this order: culture, imagination, science, math, spirituality, economics, the body, 
indigenous perspectives, and technology. Most readers would probably appreciate a bit 
more structure, but the editors’ approach is better than constraining such a complex 
issue as the ends of education within one allegedly universal set of categories. With 
respect to topic, then, “the conversation,” as the editors envision it, seems to be 
heterogeneous.  
The volume might also exemplify an ideal “conversation” at the level of 
individual essays, if most essays contained some content or method that characterizes a 
productive approach to the ends of education. But this is not the case either. Many of the 
essays make interesting arguments, but only a few are systematic in a way that might 
provide a model for scholarly conversation. Four of the essays across the two volumes 
do offer taxonomies that might help to organize our thinking about the ends of 
education. In the first of these, Brighouse argues that education should help people “to 
lead flourishing lives in multiple dimensions” (RC, 59) and that a flourishing life often 
involves the seven dimensions of money, family, work, friends/community, health, 
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freedom, and values. In the second, Fenstermacher argues that most discussions of 
educational ends focus on the reasonable but insufficient goals of academic achievement 
and educational equity. He suggests that we should also educate for reasonableness, 
agency, relationship, and morality. The third, Smylie’s prologue to the second volume, 
divides the possible ends of education into the development of the individual, the 
development of the society (economically or through increasing social justice), the 
advancement of humanity, and the cultivation of democratic values and processes. 
Finally, the fourth of these, Mike Rose’s contribution to the second volume, narrates 
Rose’s own educational journey and describes several ends: broadening knowledge of 
the world, providing a way to understand human behavior, offering a set of tools to 
think with, providing skills to act in the world, offering the pleasure of competently 
using knowledge, and having a sense of the self as capable. Each of these partly 
overlapping taxonomies is plausible, and they might provide the beginnings of a more 
systematic conceptualization of the ends of education. But the conversation as it stands 
in the Yearbook leaves it to the reader to compare or integrate them.  
There is one topic that recurs across most of the contributions: “democracy.” Of 
the first nine substantive chapters in Renewing the Conversation, six are on democracy or 
citizenship or both, and the editors say explicitly that democracy was a central editorial 
concern. For example, Fenstermacher summarizes the goal of the volumes as 
encouraging “a more expansive, robust and inclusive dialogue about education in 
democratic societies” (RC, 2). Smylie singles out the cultivation of democratic values and 
processes as one of the few basic ends of education (on the same level as developing the 
individual and developing the society) “because we consider this … purpose so 
important and so fundamental” (VC, 11). He also asserts that this heavy emphasis on 
democracy reflects the “voice” of the two volumes: “This is a time when we need to be 
particularly mindful of the very important relationship between education and 
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democratic ideals and processes” (VC, 11). In their conclusion to the first volume, Wiens 
and Coulter even claim that “democracy and education can be considered as two sides 
of the same coin” (RC, 298). People in nondemocratic societies educate, however, so it 
seems that the ends of education do not necessarily include democratic ideals and 
processes ! unless education in nondemocratic societies cannot reasonably be called 
“education,” or unless democracy is an end toward which educational processes 
naturally tend. Acts targeted to participation in the political system are also a small 
fraction of what people do in their lives, so it does not seem that a political system in the 
narrow sense can be integral to all core educational ideals and processes. The editors’ 
enthusiasm for democracy seems to envision it as something broader than a mere 
political system, as a process of sociality that is perhaps central to all societies. “The 
conversation,” then, should be democratic, but it is not fully clear what the editors mean 
by this. 
What should a “renewed” conversation about education look like? And what 
role should philosophers of education play in it ! should they lead it, or are they on 
equal footing with everyone else? We can gain insight into these issues by examining 
projected interlocutors’ tacit positioning. Like all language use, the Yearbook essays 
identify authors and readers as recognizable types of social actors. The chapters 
presuppose several types of interlocutory roles, and these represent various visions of 
what a renewed conversation should look like. A few of the essays in the first volume 
presuppose two didactic, opposed interlocutory roles. Ravitch, for instance, 
distinguishes between education that forms students to fit society and education that 
empowers individuals to direct themselves ! casting aspersions on the former and 
defending the latter. One might object to her substantive argument, but I am not doing 
so here. I focus on the interactional positions projected by her essay. She presupposes 
two camps, one associated with each of the positions she identifies. She is in one camp, 
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and less admirable others are in the other camp. Her essay thus presupposes a familiar 
type of interaction: two antagonists, each perhaps hoping to convince the other of his or 
her point of view but prepared to oppose the other if necessary. This resembles the 
interactional format enacted on contemporary political talk shows, in which “balance” 
means having one representative from each partisan camp and a series of didactic 
expositions articulating opposed views. A few other essays in the volume project similar 
oppositions. Ken Osborne distinguishes between “schooling” and “education,” decrying 
the former and championing the latter. Ian Winchester makes a distinction between the 
lawlike regularities of science and the hermeneutic richness of individual experience, 
though he does not aim to replace one with the other. Most of the essays in the second 
volume, perhaps because of their shortness, also presuppose this sort of interaction ! 
taking a relatively predictable position, or raising a familiar dichotomy and criticizing 
the other side; nonetheless, many of these contributions tell interesting stories and are 
engaging to read. It is useful to hear about education from a broad range of well-known 
figures, ranging from Barack Obama to Bill Clinton, Newt Gingrich, Bill Cosby, Ann 
Landers, Bill Gates, Geoffrey Canada, Laura Bush, Vivian Paley, Colin Powell, 
Christiane Amanpour, David Brooks, Eleanor Roosevelt, the John Birch Society, and 
many others. 
Taking and defending a clear position opposed to others’ can lead to useful 
conversation in some cases. The editors do not seem to favor this vision of an ideal 
“renewed conversation,” however. Wiens and Coulter say in their conclusion to the first 
volume that the authors offer their arguments “tentatively” and with “courageous 
humility.” In fact this describes only some of the essays, but it shows the editors’ belief 
that a productive conversation about educational ends should not be primarily didactic. 
And most essays in the first volume presuppose a different type of relation among 
interlocutors. Appiah, for instance, refuses to choose between universalism and 
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particularism. He argues that we must simultaneously keep in view both our common 
humanity and our fundamental differences. He also refuses to choose between the need 
for action and the power of reflection, arguing that the challenge of ethically living 
together with others requires both material acts and conceptual reflection. The 
interlocutory roles projected in Appiah’s argument are not opposed didactic positions. 
Instead, those drawn to universalist or particularlist, idealist or materialist views are 
asked to consider how apparently contradictory positions can each be true in some 
respects. Appiah does not immediately invite interlocutors to take his side or oppose 
him. He asks them to reconsider the assumptions they have habitually made and to join 
him in exploring the tensions and potential elaborations that might allow them to 
reconcile competing but powerful intuitions. He takes a position, but only after a more 
complex process of examining assumptions and exploring alternatives.  
Dunne adopts a similar approach in his essay, exploring divergent conceptions 
of childhood: the “privative,” which presents children as lacking mature capacities, and 
the “privileged,” which presents children as having unique capacities that they 
(unfortunately) lose as they develop. Dunne does not fully accept or reject either of these 
positions, but instead locates them sociohistorically and explores how aspects of each 
might be layered into a view that could advance contemporary thinking about 
education. Benhabib, in a well-known piece on the headscarf controversy in France, 
moves beyond the two typical reactions to the controversy: that the state was oppressing 
Muslim girls by unjustly preventing them from exercising their minority beliefs when it 
banned headscarves, or that the state was liberating the girls by allowing them to move 
beyond their patriarchal home culture. She shows how girls used the freedom of 
expression fostered by the French state to embrace a traditional symbol and thus 
articulated their own voice ! one that was distinct from their “traditional” societies (in 
which women would not have been able to speak for themselves in public like this) but 
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one that was also distinct from mainstream French culture (which avoids the mixing of 
political voice and religious belief).  
Other essays in the first volume also project interactions in which interlocutors 
work together to uncover hidden assumptions in widely held positions and to explore 
alternatives. Noddings argues, for example, that spirituality should not be avoided as an 
educational topic and explores how formal education could include critical reflection on 
this crucial dimension of human experience. Nussbaum rejects essentializing versions of 
identity politics and describes how we might educate “world citizens” who empathize 
with but do not reify “others.” Nielsen and Kinghorn show how economic 
“development,” as a model for state-to-state relations between the North and South, fails 
to account for how economic and educational processes are embedded within culturally 
specific social and political relations. These essays all project a conversation in which 
authors work with interlocutors to examine implausible assumptions that lie behind 
familiar points of view and to explore alternatives that might be more productive.  
I argue that this type of interactional organization captures something important 
about “the conversation” as the editors imagine it. The authors who write this way 
project a privileged status for themselves, because they are the ones able to uncover 
others’ tacit (and sometimes invalid) assumptions and they are the ones able to model a 
more incisive examination of assumptions and a more productive search for alternatives. 
But the authors are not didactic, and they do not adopt an omniscient voice in which 
they are able to foresee all relevant alternatives. Instead, after pointing out the 
shortcomings of common assumptions, most authors invite readers into a conversation 
about alternatives. These projected interactional roles remind me of the Socratic 
elenchus in the early Platonic dialogues, in which Socrates first showed interlocutors the 
implausibility of their habitual answers to important questions and then explored 
alternative accounts with them. These Socratic conversations are not nihilist ! Socrates 
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and most interlocutors assumed that we share standards and therefore are able to judge 
some arguments as better than others ! but they are aporetic and thus presuppose that 
ongoing conversation is required to address fundamental questions. The Socratic 
elenchus captures the interactional roles presupposed in the majority of the essays: 
academics have the capacity and the responsibility to show people how their taken-for-
granted assumptions about educational ends have some undesirable consequences, and 
academics should help guide open-ended conversations about these and alternative 
approaches to fundamental educational questions, but people must engage in the 
conversations themselves and cannot simply be told what to believe. 
In at least one crucial respect, then, the Yearbook is compatible with the Handbook: 
both presuppose that philosophers have some expert knowledge that will allow them to 
formulate better arguments that might enrich public conversations about education. The 
Yearbook aims to apply such knowledge, however, not to foster disciplinary research. 
And the Yearbook suggests that educational publics will make crucial contributions to the 
resulting conversations. Philosophers may catalyze or midwife these contributions, at 
least in some cases, but educational researchers, policymakers, and practitioners, as well 
as citizens will provide essential content. Thus the Yearbook turns both inward and 
outward, drawing on philosophy but using it for a conversation that extends beyond the 
discipline.  
Heterogeneous Stances in the Philosophy of Education 
First impressions of the Handbook and the Yearbook are partly misleading. The 
Handbook does not merely represent an elitist vision in which knowledge flows 
downstream from general philosophers to philosophers of education, and thence 
perhaps to educational publics. It does turn inward toward the discipline, and many 
chapters in the Handbook show how philosophers of education could productively draw 
on general philosophers’ arguments and enlist them to help address educational 
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questions. This could surely help philosophers of education do substantive work that 
might contribute to policy and practice. But the Handbook also argues that general 
philosophers sometimes need to engage with educational issues in order to do the core 
work of the discipline, and this leaves open the possibility that general philosophers 
might even engage with educational research, policy, and practice as another way of 
enriching their thought. On the other side, the Yearbook does not simply represent a 
populist vision in which philosophers help articulate the wisdom of the masses by 
participating in the public’s ongoing conversation about education. It does turn outward 
toward educational publics, illustrating how philosophers could productively engage 
with public conversations about education and showing how ongoing public 
conversations already include many provocative ideas and some interesting arguments 
about the ends of education. But the first volume of the Yearbook also presupposes that 
philosophers have expertise that can help clarify and deepen public conversations. This 
is compatible with the Handbook’s vision in some ways, as professional philosophers will 
provide some expert knowledge and practices that can catalyze “the conversation.”  
The two projects differ significantly in spirit, however. The Handbook’s turn 
toward the discipline yields more compelling arguments, but it usually presupposes that 
knowledge flows downstream from philosophers to educational publics. For both of 
these reasons (rigor and elitism), some who like the Handbook will not like the Yearbook, 
and vice versa. It is nonetheless useful to read these projects together because the hybrid 
positions sketched in the preceding paragraph might be combined into a broader vision 
for philosophy of education. On such a view, knowledge does not simply flow 
downstream from academic experts to educational publics because even general 
philosophers can learn new things about their core interests from engaging with 
educational processes and educational practices. Philosophers have some superior 
knowledge and skills that could improve public theories and practices. Publics also have 
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the right and some relevant knowledge to participate in conversations about educational 
means and ends, but they could use expert help sometimes. This would seem to position 
philosophy of education as a broker, contributing to disciplinary knowledge but also 
facilitating engagement between disciplinary ideas and relevant publics.  
I argue that we should do that in various ways. Philosophers of education should 
not have only one stance in their role at the intersection of disciplinary philosophy and 
educational research, policy, and practice. Sometimes colleagues and publics respond 
well to a didactic stance, in which a philosopher articulates and defends a position 
opposed to commonly held views. Philosophers of education can do this by, for 
example, exposing the assumptions about knowledge contained in educational 
“standards” and arguing for an alternative view of human flourishing. Sometimes 
colleagues and publics benefit from Socratic questioning, from having an interlocutor 
expose their faulty assumptions and work with them toward more plausible answers to 
complex educational questions. Philosophers of education can do this by, for example, 
showing people both the benefits and the limits of decontextualized knowledge and 
exploring the question of how knowledge, reasoning skills, and cognitive dispositions 
are all required for full cognitive functioning. Bakhtinian polyphony provides a third 
alternative. Mikhail Bakhtin described how novelists such as Fyodor Dostoevsky 
struggle not to take a final position and encourage multiple voices to engage in 
unfinalizable dialogue. Interlocutors espousing a Rabelaisian philosophy revel in 
multiplicity and heterogeneity, deliberately flouting convention and eschewing closure. 
The Handbook and the Yearbook do not contain many examples of such an approach, but 
we certainly have colleagues who revel in the incompleteness of all complex arguments. 
Philosophers of education could be Bakhtinian, trying to keep alive multiple voices on 
essentially contestable educational issues and fostering engagement among 
contradictory positions. Jürgen Habermas offers a fourth alternative with his more 
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sober, rationalistic ideal speech situation in which people aim for consensus. This, too, 
has its place, and educators could help create spaces in which stakeholders have the 
opportunity to examine the merits of each other’s arguments and to work toward a 
mutually acceptable view of issues. I have my personal favorites among these four 
stances, but I believe that philosophers of education could productively adopt each of 
them in different circumstances. Depending on the stance we choose, we will use 
different tools from our philosophical repertoires, and we will position ourselves 
differently with respect to the discipline and with respect to educational publics. 
Philosophers of education could also productively engage in various ways with 
fields beyond philosophy. We could (and some already do) usefully engage with 
scientific research ! not just to analyze it philosophically, but to take on the role of a 
scientist and accept some scientific conclusions, grafting a scientific disposition onto a 
philosophical one. Such a stance could allow philosophers to make and examine 
educational claims in productive ways. In his Handbook chapter, D.C. Phillips argues 
convincingly that both general philosophers and philosophers of education should be 
more familiar with empirical research in education because philosophical arguments 
about educational questions sometimes depend on empirical claims. If philosophers and 
researchers paid more attention to each other’s work, researchers would “think about 
their work with greater clarity and [philosophers would] be led down interesting 
philosophical paths” (Phillips in OPE, 402). As another alternative, philosophers of 
education could (and some already do) work to solve problems of educational practice 
or policy, perhaps partnering with practitioners and contributing philosophical skills to 
solve educational problems or to seize educational opportunities in schools and 
communities. Engagement with practice or policy, in a situation where concrete actions 
must be taken, often forces an academic to reflect on familiar ideas in new ways. I would 
not want philosophers simply to become practitioners, such that they lose their 
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distinctive knowledge and skills, but doing practical work and relating the experiences 
to one’s philosophy can enrich both. As a third alternative, philosophers of education 
might (and some already do) communicate philosophy through contemporary electronic 
media. One essay in Voices from the Conversation, by the Liberal Democrats Online Policy 
Consultation Group, includes online responses posted on a website. Might blogs, wikis, 
tweets, samples, and other forms of online publication and social networking facilitate 
conversation about education? Could alternative modes of representation ! such as 
film, for example ! open up new possibilities for academic work? Given the divergent 
affordances of these media, we cannot simply transfer academic conversation into them. 
It might nonetheless be useful to deploy some philosophical resources in communication 
genres other than traditional philosophical ones. 
These different stances ! didactic, Socratic, Bakhtinian, Habermasian, and 
engagement in empirical research, educational practice, or alternative media ! are of 
course heterogeneous, and various combinations and alternatives are possible. But they 
cannot all be reduced to one type of stance or one type of activity, and I argue that we 
should not try to pick one best stance for all philosophers of education. Different 
philosophers should position themselves differently, and individual philosophers 
should adopt different stances at different times. Sometimes knowledge and skills can 
usefully flow downstream to educational researchers, practitioners, and policymakers, 
through didactic or Socratic interventions, for example. Philosophers have made 
distinctions, reframed questions, and posed alternatives that have been and could be 
useful for more applied fields, and philosophers of education can productively deploy 
these resources or communicate useful results downstream. But resources can 
productively move upstream as well. As Cuypers and Kitcher argue in their Handbook 
chapters, core problems in general philosophy sometimes require reflection on 
educational questions. Philosophers of education tend to engage with both philosophical 
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and practical questions, and they might be useful brokers for engaging philosophy more 
deeply with practice. In general, then, philosophers’ knowledge and skills can be 
productively deployed in various settings and various ways, and resources from other 
domains of research and practice can sometimes be useful for doing philosophy. As a 
field located on the boundary, philosophy of education has an opportunity to broker 
such exchanges and to create useful hybrids. We may be marginal, but in cases where 
boundary crossing is valued, marginality can be an asset. I suggest that we embrace 
heterogeneity.  
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